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Abstract
Several contributions have already pointed out that initial wealth in-
equalities do persist in the long run in the Ramsey model with heteroge-
nous agents. We show that this result is not robust to the introduction
of endogenous fertility. Our argument builds on the Barro-Becker (1989)
seminal model extended to allow for heterogenous agents with different
capital endowments. Strikingly enough, individual consumption levels,
fertility rates and capital stocks are shown to be equalized after only one
adjustment period. This property is shown to hold irrespective of the
production sector specification.
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1 Introduction
Following the paper by Chatterjee (1994), several contributions have introduced
households’ heterogeneity in the Ramsey model through wealth inequality. The
main focus of this recent literature is the existence of a representative con-
sumer summarizing the average behavior of the economy and the persistence of
inequalities during the transitional dynamics and in the steady state.
These questions have been extensively studied by Chatterjee (1994), Caselli
and Ventura (2000) and Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2009) in the standard
set-up where households derive utility from consumption only. These papers
show that while wealth inequalities may be reduced, they do persist in the
long-run.
This analysis has been extended to models where households also derive util-
ity from leisure, namely when labor supply is endogenous. In this framework,
Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2008) and Sorger (2000) have worked out the
exogenous growth case, while Garcia-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2006) have pro-
vided with an inspection of the nexus between growth and income inequality
when growth is endogenous. Ultimately, all these papers show that while in-
troducing endogenous labor does affect both the convergence and the long-run
allocation properties of the growth models under scrutiny, it does not alter the
outcomes on the persistence of inequalities: inequalities still persist in all these
extensions.
The aim of this paper is to re-examine the issue of persistence of wealth in-
equalities under endogenous fertility.1 In sharp contrast to the existing literature
surveyed just above, we show that inequalities do no more persist. Even more
strikingly, we show that if time starts at period 0, individual consumptions, fer-
tility rates and capital distribution become equal from period 1 onwards. This
means that wealth inequalities vanish after only one adjustment period.
To establish these results, we build on the seminal Barro and Becker (1989)
model. This model provides a benchmark to account for fertility decisions. We
generalize this framework by introducing heterogeneous households which differ
in their initial capital endowments. We show that when households smooth
consumption over time and optimally choose the number of children, individual
consumptions should be equal after one period. This striking property essen-
tially derives from the resulting equality between the marginal benefit and cost
of bequest: consumptions are then shown to be independent of the capital dis-
tribution after one period. This in turn implies that fertility rates and capital
held by each household become also identical after one period. Therefore, in-
troducing endogenous fertility in the optimal growth model rules out wealth
inequalities after only one adjustment period. Finally, it is important to notice
that we show our result for a given sequence of prices over time. This means
that it does not depend on the specification of the production sector, and occurs
under exogenous as well as endogenous growth.
1Note that when the cost per child is a time cost, as we assume in this paper, fertility
choices constitute another way to introduce endogenous labor.
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This note is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the behavior
of heterogeneous households. In Section 3, we show our result on the loss of
heterogeneity after one period, while some technical details are reported in the
Appendix.
2 Households’ behavior
We extend the Barro and Becker (1989) model to account for wealth hetero-
geneity. We consider an economy with H dynasties of altruistic households,
i = 1, ...,H, that differ in their individual wealth. In other words, we focus on
heterogeneity in initial capital endowment ki0, i.e. kh0 6= kj0 for h 6= j.
Following Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989), each person
lives for two periods, childhood and adulthood, and has children at the beginning
of his adult period. Parents are altruistic towards their children, i.e. utility
depends on their own consumption, the number of surviving children and the
utility of each child. The utility of an adult of type i belonging to the generation
born at t− 1, is given by:
Uit = u (cit) +
(
αn−εit
)
nitUit+1 (1)
where cit is the individual consumption giving an instantaneous utility u (cit),
while nit is the number of children. We notice that αn
−ε
it measures the degree of
altruism towards each child, with α, ε ∈ (0, 1), and Uit+1 is the utility attained
by each child. We further assume:
Assumption 1 The utility function u (ci) is defined on R+, two-times contin-
uously differentiable on R++, strictly increasing (u′ (ci) > 0), strictly concave
(u′′ (ci) < 0) and satisfies −u
′′(ci)u(ci)
u′(ci)2
> ε1−ε .
2 Noting σ (ci) = ciu
′ (ci) /u (ci),
we assume 0 < σ (ci) < 1− ε and σ (ci) is non-increasing.
Notice that the utility function u (ci) = c
σ
i , with σ < 1−ε, satisfies Assump-
tion 1.3
As stressed by Becker and Barro (1988), the recursive model (1) can be
equivalently written as an optimal growth model where the household of type i
maximizes a dynastic utility:
∞∑
t=0
αtN1−εit u (cit) (2)
with Nit the size of the ith subpopulation at period t, under a sequence of
budget constraints:
cit + nitkit+1 = Rtkit + wt (1− βnit) (3)
2As it is explicitly shown in Becker and Barro (1986), this inequality ensures that the
second-order conditions are satisfied for the households’ utility maximization.
3This utility function is considered in the seminal contributions of Becker and Barro (1988)
and Barro and Becker (1989).
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t = 0, 1, . . ., and given the unequal distribution of initial capital ki0, with kh0 6=
kj0 for h 6= j.
The left-hand side of (3) represents households’ expenditures. In particular,
kit+1 represents the bequest per child, through physical as well as human capital
used for production in the next period. The right-hand side of (3) represents
the disposable income, where wt is the wage rate and Rt ≡ 1 − δ + rt the
gross return on capital, with δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of capital and
rt the real interest rate. As mentioned in the introduction, we do not specify
the production sector in order to highlight that our result holds irrespective of
the production technology. Accordingly, we assume that the sequence of prices
(wt, Rt), t = 0, 1..., is given.
At adulthood, each household is endowed with one unit of time that she
shares between labor and leisure. The time cost of rearing children is given by
βnitwt, where β is the constant cost per child in units of time. Leisure time
βnit = 1− lit ∈ (0, 1) is spent with children, whereas lit is the individual labor
supply at period t.
Since nit represents the population growth factor of dynasty i, the size of a
dynasty at time t is given by:
Nit = nit−1Nit−1 = Ni0
t−1∏
s=0
nis (4)
where Ni0 > 0 are given for i = 1, ...,H, and heterogeneous initial population
sizes are not excluded, i.e. Nh0 6= Nj0 for h 6= j.
Maximizing utility (2) under the budget constraints (3), the household i
chooses a sequence (kit+1, nit, cit)
∞
t=0 of saving, consumption, number of chil-
dren. The household behavior may be summarized by:4
Rtkit + wt (1− βnit) = cit + nitkit+1 (5)
u′ (cit) /u′ (cit+1) = αn−εit Rt+1 (6)
αtN1−εit u
′ (cit) (βwt + kit+1) =
1− ε
nit
∞∑
s=t+1
αsN1−εis u (cis) (7)
with the transversality condition:
lim
t→+∞α
tN1−εit u
′ (cit)nitkit+1 = 0
Equation (5) is the household’s budget constraint. The intertemporal trade-
offs are summarized by (6) and (7). The Euler equation (6) shows how dynasties
smooth consumption over time. Since the marginal utility of consumption de-
pends on population size Nit and total bequest nitkit+1, which in turn depend
on the number of children, this choice between current and future consumption
depends on the fertility rate. Finally, equation (7) determines the optimal num-
ber of children. The cost per child in unit of time and in terms of bequest (on
the left-hand side) is equal to the discounted sum of the marginal utility gains
over all the subsequent periods (on the right-hand side).
4See the Appendix for details.
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3 The “loss” of heterogeneity
Using the optimal behavior of the households, we show now that from period
1 onwards, the individual consumptions cit, the number of children nit and the
wealth kit become equal. As underlined above, this property is demonstrated
without specifying the production sector, the sequence of prices (wt, Rt), for
t = 0, 1..., is given.
As explained in the Appendix, equation (7) can also be written as:
(1− ε)αu (cit+1) + αu′ (cit+1) (Rt+1kit+1 + wt+1 − cit+1)
= nεitu
′ (cit) (βwt + kit+1) (8)
Substituting equation (6), we get:
cit+1
1− ε− σ(cit+1)
σ(cit+1)
= βwtRt+1 − wt+1 , for t = 0, 1... and i = 1, ...,H (9)
Under Assumption 1, there is a unique solution cit+1 solving this equation.
In other words, for all t = 1, ... and i = 1, ...,H, we have cit ≡ ct, with
ct = (βwt−1Rt − wt) σ(ct)
1− ε− σ(ct) (10)
From period t = 1 onwards, the individual consumptions are equal. One can
see that ct is increasing in the time cost per child measured in physical units
of the next period, because the dynasty substitutes investment in children for
future consumption. However, less children means a lower labor force, which
explains that consumption is decreasing in the current wage.
Most importantly for our purpose, individual consumptions get equalized
because cit does not depend on capital holding kit and, therefore, it is inde-
pendent of the distribution of capital. Indeed, recall that kit+1 represents the
bequest per child given by a parent living at period t. Equation (8), represents
the intertemporal trade-off to have children: it equalizes the marginal benefit
to have children (on the left-hand side) to its marginal cost (on the right-hand
side). In particular, αu′ (cit+1)Rt+1kit+1 represents the marginal benefit of be-
quest, while nεitu
′ (cit) kit+1 is its marginal cost. Taking into account the optimal
choice between current and future consumption (see (6)), the marginal benefit
of bequest becomes equal to its marginal cost, implying individual consumption
to be independent of wealth.
Since consumptions are identical from t = 1, the Euler equation (6) implies
that the fertility rates are also identical from t = 1, i.e. nit ≡ nt for all t = 1, ...
and i = 1, ...,H. Using (10), we obtain:
nεt = αRt+1u
′(ct+1)/u′(ct) (11)
Because consumptions do not depend on the wealth distribution and get
equalized across dynasties, the number of child is also equalized for t = 1, ....
A question now emerges. What can we infer for individual wealth? We show
that capital distribution becomes also homogenous from period t = 1.
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Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, for t = 1, ..., the distribution of capital is
also homogeneous, i.e. kit = kt for all i = 1, ...,H.
Proof. Using (5) and (7), we get:
Rtkit − cit + wt = 1− ε
u′ (cit)
∞∑
s=t+1
αs−t
(
Nis
Nit
)1−ε
u (cis) (12)
We have cit = ct and nit = nt for all t = 1, ..., and Nis = Ni1
∏s−1
t=1 nt.
Therefore, equation (12) writes for t = 1:
R1ki1 + w1 − c1 = 1− ε
u′ (c1)
∞∑
s=2
αs−1
(
s−1∏
t=1
nt
)1−ε
u (cs) (13)
This shows that the capital distribution is homogeneous at t = 1, i.e. ki1 ≡
k1 for all i = 1, ...,H. From t = 1, the budget constraint (5) becomes:
kit+1 =
Rt
nt
kit +
wt (1− βnt)− ct
nt
(14)
Since ki1 = kj1 = k1 for all i, j = 1, ...,H, we deduce that kit = kjt ≡ kt for
all i, j = 1, ...,H and t = 1, . . . This proves that the capital distribution is equal
from t = 1 onwards.
This proposition shows that introducing endogenous fertility in the opti-
mal growth model with heterogeneous households has critical implications for
the capital distribution. In contrast to previous results with exogenous pop-
ulation size (Caselli and Ventura (2000), Chatterjee (1994), Garcia-Pen˜alosa
and Turnovsky (2006, 2008, 2009), Sorger (2000)), inequality does not persist
and the wealth distribution becomes homogenous from t = 1. As already em-
phasized, this arises from the disjunction between individual consumptions and
capital holdings, which is explained by the fact that households do not only
make an intertemporal choice between present and future consumptions, but
also optimally choose the number of their children.
We now come to some observations on the robustness of our findings.
Remark 1. In our analysis, we assume that the counterpart of having children
is a time cost per child βwt. Another traditional cost specification is to consider
a cost in terms of the final good (see Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and
Becker (1989)). One may easily see that this alternative specification of the
cost per child does not change our conclusions on the loss of heterogeneity from
t = 1.
Remark 2. As already underlined, our result is shown for a given sequence
of prices (wt, Rt), t = 0, . . . This means that it neither depends on the microe-
conomic foundations of the production sector, nor on the assumptions on the
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technology. As a direct implication, if one introduces a standard convex tech-
nology with constant returns, the economy may obviously converge to a steady
state with a homogenous wealth distribution. If one introduces a technology
leading to endogenous growth (as in Bosi and Seegmuller (2010)), there may
exist a unique balanced growth path where all the individuals have the same
wealth growing at a similar well-defined rate.
4 Appendix
The optimal behavior of household
We derive the infinite-horizon Lagrangian function with respect to cit, kit,
nit:
∞∑
t=0
αtN1−εit u (cit) +
∞∑
t=0
λit [Rtkit + wt (1− βnit)− cit − nitkit+1] (15)
in order to obtain the first-order conditions:
λit = α
tN1−εit u
′ (cit) (16)
λitnit = λit+1Rt+1 (17)
λit (βwt + kit+1) =
1− ε
nit
∞∑
s=t+1
αsN1−εis u (cis) (18)
with the transversality condition:
lim
t→+∞α
tN1−εit u
′ (cit)nitkit+1 = 0
Noticing that nit = Nit+1/Nit, we get from (16) and (17) a sequence of Euler
equations (6). Using (16) and (18), we obtain (7). From (18), we also have:
nitλit (βwt + kit+1) = (1− ε)αt+1N1−εit+1u (cit+1) + (1− ε)
∞∑
s=t+2
αsN1−εis u (cis)
Substituting
(1− ε)
∞∑
s=t+2
αsN1−εis u (cis) = nit+1λit+1 (βwt+1 + kit+2)
and using (16) again, we find:
(1− ε)αN1−εit+1u (cit+1) = nitN1−εit u′ (cit) (βwt + kit+1)
−αN1−εit+1u′ (cit+1)nit+1 (βwt+1 + kit+2)
7
Replacing nit = Nit+1/Nit and nit+1 (βwt+1 + kit+2) = Rt+1kit+1 + wt+1 −
cit+1, we finally obtain the trade-off:
(1− ε)αu (cit+1) = nεitu′ (cit) (βwt + kit+1)
−αu′ (cit+1) (Rt+1kit+1 + wt+1 − cit+1)
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